Table 1: Future value of $1 at various interest rates, compounded annually:

FV = 1(1 + r)^t

FV = future value; r = interest rate expressed as decimal; t = time, i.e., # of years. In the left hand column is the number of years. In the top row is the interest rate.

	1%	2%	3%	4%	5%
1	1.01	1.02	1.03	1.04	1.05
2	1.0201	1.0404	1.0609	1.0816	1.1025
3	1.0303	1.0612	1.0927	1.1249	1.1576
4	1.0406	1.0824	1.1255	1.1699	1.2155
5	1.051	1.1041	1.1593	1.2167	1.2763
6	1.0615	1.1262	1.1941	1.2653	1.3401
7	1.0721	1.1487	1.2299	1.3159	1.4071
8	1.0829	1.1717	1.2668	1.3686	1.4775
9	1.0937	1.1951	1.3048	1.4233	1.5513
10	1.1046	1.219	1.3439	1.4802	1.6289
20	1.2202	1.4859	1.8061	2.1911	2.6533
30	1.3478	1.8114	2.4273	3.2434	4.3219
	6%	7%	8%	9%	10%
1	1.06	1.07	1.08	1.09	1.1
2	1.1236	1.1449	1.1664	1.1881	1.21
3	1.191	1.225	1.2597	1.295	1.331
4	1.2625	1.3108	1.3605	1.4116	1.4641
5	1.3382	1.4026	1.4693	1.5386	1.6105
6	1.4185	1.5007	1.5869	1.6771	1.7716
7	1.5036	1.6058	1.7138	1.828	1.9487
8	1.5938	1.7182	1.8509	1.9926	2.1436
9	1.6895	1.8385	1.999	2.1719	2.3579
10	1.7908	1.9672	2.1589	2.3674	2.5937
20	3.2071	3.8697	4.661	5.6044	6.7275
30	5.7435	7.6123	10.063	13.268	17.449

Table 2: Present Value of $1 at a future date at a given interest rate compounded annually: PV = 1/(1 + r)^t

	1%	2%	3%	4%	5%
1	0.9901	0.9804	0.9709	0.9615	0.9524
2	0.9803	0.9612	0.9426	0.9246	0.907
3	0.9706	0.9423	0.9151	0.889	0.8638
4	0.961	0.9238	0.8885	0.8548	0.8227
5	0.9515	0.9057	0.8626	0.8219	0.7835
6	0.942	0.888	0.8375	0.7903	0.7462
7	0.9327	0.8706	0.8131	0.7599	0.7107
8	0.9235	0.8535	0.7894	0.7307	0.6768
9	0.9143	0.8368	0.7664	0.7026	0.6446
10	0.9053	0.8203	0.7441	0.6756	0.6139
20	0.8195	0.673	0.5537	0.4564	0.3769
30	0.7419	0.5521	0.412	0.3083	0.2314
	6%	7%	8%	9%	10%
1	0.9434	0.9346	0.9259	0.9174	0.9091
2	0.89	0.8734	0.8573	0.8417	0.8264
3	0.8396	0.8163	0.7938	0.7722	0.7513
4	0.7921	0.7629	0.735	0.7084	0.683
5	0.7473	0.713	0.6806	0.6499	0.6209
6	0.705	0.6663	0.6302	0.5963	0.5645
7	0.6651	0.6227	0.5835	0.547	0.5132
8	0.6274	0.582	0.5403	0.5019	0.4665
9	0.5919	0.5439	0.5002	0.4604	0.4241
10	0.5584	0.5083	0.4632	0.4224	0.3855
20	0.3118	0.2584	0.2145	0.1784	0.1486
30	0.1741	0.1314	0.0994	0.0754	0.0573

Table 3: Present Value of a $1 Annuity Discounted by a Given Interest rate for a Certain Number of Annual Payments: PV = (-0.1)*(1-1/(1 + i)^–t))/i

	1%	2%	3%	4%	5%
1	0.9901	0.9804	0.9709	0.9615	0.9524
2	1.9704	1.9416	1.9135	1.8861	1.8594
3	2.941	2.8839	2.8286	2.7751	2.7232
4	3.902	3.8077	3.7171	3.6299	3.546
5	4.8534	4.7135	4.5797	4.4518	4.3295
6	5.7955	5.6014	5.4172	5.2421	5.0757
7	6.7282	6.472	6.2303	6.0021	5.7864
8	7.6517	7.3255	7.0197	6.7327	6.4632
9	8.566	8.1622	7.7861	7.4353	7.1078
10	9.4713	8.9826	8.5302	8.1109	7.7217
20	18.046	16.351	14.877	13.59	12.462
30	25.808	22.396	19.6	17.292	15.372
	6%	7%	8%	9%	10%
1	0.9434	0.9346	0.9259	0.9174	0.9091
2	1.8334	1.808	1.7833	1.7591	1.7355
3	2.673	2.6243	2.5771	2.5313	2.4869
4	3.4651	3.3872	3.3121	3.2397	3.1699
5	4.2124	4.1002	3.9927	3.8897	3.7908
6	4.9173	4.7665	4.6229	4.4859	4.3553
7	5.5824	5.3893	5.2064	5.033	4.8684
8	6.2098	5.9713	5.7466	5.5348	5.3349
9	6.8017	6.5152	6.2469	5.9952	5.759
10	7.3601	7.0236	6.7101	6.4177	6.1446
20	11.47	10.594	9.8181	9.1285	8.5136
30	13.765	12.409	11.258	10.274	9.4269

10. Now: let’s assume that the discount rate in our problems above is 8% and rework the answers. Compare the present value of taxpayer’s $60,000 tax liability on the very same transactions in 2000 under each of the five rules:

(1) CIR’s view, of the 1917 regulations, and the Supreme Court’s holding in Bruun: taxpayer derives taxable income at the termination of the lease equal to fmv – (ab in old building).

• In 2000, what is the present value of taxpayer’s net tax liability?

(2) Miller v. Gearin: taxpayer must recognize taxable income equal to the fmv of that improvement in the year of completion.

• In 2000, what is the present value of taxpayer’s net tax liability?

(3) New regulations that the Court referenced in Bruun that Treasury promulgated after Miller: the discounted PV of improvement’s fmv at the termination of lease is included in taxpayer’s taxable income at the time of completion of the building.

• In 2000, what is the present value of taxpayer’s net tax liability?

(4) Even newer regulations and the rule of the Court of Claims’s holding in M.E. Blatt Co. v. U.S.: taxpayer/lessor must determine what the fmv of the improvement will be at the termination of the lease and report as taxable income for each remaining year of the lease an aliquot share of that depreciated amount. In the event of premature termination, taxpayer/lessor must report as taxable income or may claim as a reduction to his/her taxable income an amount equal to (fmv at time of termination) – (amount of income previously taxed).

• In 2000, what is the present value of taxpayer’s net tax liability?

(5) §§ 109/1019, Hewitt Realty Co. v. CIR, and Supreme Court holding in M.E. Blatt Co. v. U.S.

• In 2000, what is the present value of taxpayer’s net tax liability?

11. The time value of money is one place where taxpayers and the Commissioner now play the tax game. Look for the ways in which it affects the contentions of parties in the cases ahead. The higher the discount rate, the more taxpayer benefits from deferring payment of a tax and/or accelerating a deduction.

12. Congress can itself exploit the time value of money to pursue certain policy objectives that require taxpayers to save money for specified forms of consumption. For example, Congress may wish for taxpayers to save money throughout their working lives that they can spend in retirement. Sections 219/62(a)(7) permit taxpayers to reduce their adjusted gross income (AGI) by amounts that they save in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). So also, Congress may wish for taxpayers to save money that they can spend on medical expenses at some future date. Sections 223/62(a)(19) permit taxpayers to reduce their (AGI) by amounts that they save in a Health Savings Account. The money that taxpayers deposit in these accounts at a young age can grow significantly, as the tables above attest.

E. Imputed Income

Consider the following:

Mary and John are attorneys who both are in the 25% marginal tax bracket. They are equally productive and efficient in their work as attorneys. They both own houses that need a paint job. The cost of hiring a painter to paint their homes is $9000.

• John hires a painter to paint his house. To pay the painter, John must work six extra weekends in order to earn another $12,000. After paying $3000 in taxes, John can pay the painter $9000. For having worked to earn an additional $12,000 and paid $3000 more in income tax, John will have a house with a $9000 paint job – which he will commence “consuming.” John had to pay $3000 in income taxes to consume $9000.

• Mary decides to do the job herself on five successive weekends. The fmv of these services is $9000. When she has completed the job, Mary will have a house with a $9000 paint job – which she will commence “consuming.” Mary paid nothing in income taxes to consume $9000.

Notice: John earned $2000 per weekend. Mary “earned” $1800 per weekend. Mary is not as productive or as efficient a painter as she is an attorney. Nevertheless, Mary expended fewer resources to acquire a painted house than John did. How?

• The answer lies in the fact that John had to pay income tax on his “consumption,” and Mary did not.

• Services that one performs for oneself give rise to “imputed income.”

• As a matter of administrative practice and convenience, we do not tax imputed income.

• As the facts of this hypothetical illustrate, not taxing imputed income causes inefficiency. Mary would create more value by practicing law on the weekends than by painting.

• Not taxing imputed income also causes distortions because from Mary’s point of view, not taxing her imputed income encourages her to perform more services for herself – so long as the cost of her inefficiency is less than the income taxes that she saves.

• In addition to these inefficiencies and distortions, not taxing imputed income derived from performing services for oneself costs the U.S. Treasury money. Obviously, we should not be concerned about de minimis amounts, e.g., mowing our own lawns. But one major source of lost revenue is the non-taxation of imputed income derived by the stay-at-home parent.

Eileen and Robert are both in the 25% tax bracket. Assume that the annual rental rate for a home is 10% of the home’s fmv. Both Robert and Eileen have accumulated $250,000. The income necessary to accumulate this money has already been subject to income tax. Prevailing interest rates are 8%.

• Robert elects to take the $20,000 return on his investments to pay the rent on a house valued at $150,000. After paying $5000 in income taxes, he will have $15,000 with which to pay rent. His investment will not grow because he uses his entire return on investment to pay income tax plus rent.

• Eileen elects to change the form in which she holds some of her investment and to use $150,000 to purchase a house. She will still have $100,000 invested. Eileen can live in her house rent-free and will earn a 6% (i.e., 8% – (25% of 8%)) after-tax return on her investment, compounded annually. See table 1 in the discussion of Bruun, supra. In less than 16 years, Eileen will have $250,000 PLUS she will own a $150,000 home (assuming that it does not lose value; its value might even increase).

Notice: Obviously Eileen came out ahead of Robert. Both Eileen and Robert started with the same wealth and lived in the same type of house. How did Eileen do so much better than Robert?

• Again, Robert had to pay income tax on his consumption while Eileen did not.

• The fair rental value of property that a taxpayer owns is also imputed income, and it is not subject to income tax.

• As the facts of this hypothetical illustrate, not taxing imputed income causes inefficiency because it encourages taxpayers to invest in assets that they can use in preference to other investments.

• A house is something that a consumer can and wants to consume.

• Not taxing imputed income derived from ownership of property increases a taxpayer’s return on investing in such property. Eileen received $15,000 worth of rent annually on her $150,000 investment – a tax-free return of 10%. A net after-tax return of 10% subject to 25% income tax would require a before-tax return of 13.33%.

• A major source of lost revenue to the Treasury through the non-taxation of the fair rental value of property that taxpayer owns results from Americans’ widespread ownership of homes – and the ownership of homes that are more expensive than what many taxpayers would otherwise purchase.

• Perhaps the risk-adjusted return on Turkish apricot futures is greater than the 10% return Eileen so easily earned on her investment in a house, but Eileen will not choose to maximize her investment return in this manner unless the return on such an investment is greater than 13.33%. The Tax Code assures that many taxpayers will prefer to purchase assets such as homes rather than make investments with higher before-tax returns.

• If excluding the fair rental value of a home from its owner’s gross income is not sufficient motivation to buy a home –

• § 121 permits exclusion from gross income of up to $250,000 of gain from the sale or exchange of a taxpayer’s principal residence under prescribed circumstances.

Can a taxpayer realize income if he never receives it, but someone else does?

MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole question for decision is whether the gift, during the donor’s taxable year, of interest coupons detached from the bonds, delivered to the donee and later in the year paid at maturity, is the realization of income taxable to the donor.

In 1934 and 1935, respondent, the owner of negotiable bonds, detached from them negotiable interest coupons shortly before their due date and delivered them as a gift to his son, who, in the same year, collected them at maturity. The Commissioner ruled that, under … [§ 61], the interest payments were taxable, in the years when paid, to the respondent donor, who reported his income on the cash receipts basis. The circuit court of appeals reversed the order of the Board of Tax Appeals sustaining the tax. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in the administration of the revenue laws and because of an asserted conflict in principle of the decision below with that of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, and with that of decisions by other circuit courts of appeals. See Bishop v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 298; Dickey v. Burnet, 56 F.2d 917, 921; Van Meter v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 817.

The court below thought that, as the consideration for the coupons had passed to the obligor, the donor had, by the gift, parted with all control over them and their payment, and for that reason the case was distinguishable from Lucas v. Earl, supra, and Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, where the assignment of compensation for services had preceded the rendition of the services, and where the income was held taxable to the donor.

The holder of a coupon bond is the owner of two independent and separable kinds of right. One is the right to demand and receive at maturity the principal amount of the bond representing capital investment. The other is the right to demand and receive interim payments of interest on the investment in the amounts and on the dates specified by the coupons. Together, they are an obligation to pay principal and interest given in exchange for money or property which was presumably the consideration for the obligation of the bond. Here respondent, as owner of the bonds, had acquired the legal right to demand payment at maturity of the interest specified by the coupons and the power to command its payment to others which constituted an economic gain to him.

Admittedly not all economic gain of the taxpayer is taxable income. From the beginning, the revenue laws have been interpreted as defining “realization” of income as the taxable event, rather than the acquisition of the right to receive it. And “realization” is not deemed to occur until the income is paid. But the decisions and regulations have consistently recognized that receipt in cash or property is not the only characteristic of realization of income to a taxpayer on the cash receipts basis. Where the taxpayer does not receive payment of income in money or property, realization may occur when the last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already accrued to him. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378. Cf. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670.

In the ordinary case the taxpayer who acquires the right to receive income is taxed when he receives it, regardless of the time when his right to receive payment accrued. But the rule that income is not taxable until realized has never been taken to mean that the taxpayer, even on the cash receipts basis, who has fully enjoyed the benefit of the economic gain represented by his right to receive income can escape taxation because he has not himself received payment of it from his obligor. The rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt of it by the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer’s personal receipt of money or property. [citation omitted] This may occur when he has made such use or disposition of his power to receive or control the income as to procure in its place other satisfactions which are of economic worth. The question here is whether, because one who in fact receives payment for services or interest payments is taxable only on his receipt of the payments, he can escape all tax by giving away his right to income in advance of payment. If the taxpayer procures payment directly to his creditors of the items of interest or earnings due him, see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra; [citations omitted], or if he sets up a revocable trust with income payable to the objects of his bounty, [citation omitted], [citations omitted], he does not escape taxation because he did not actually receive the money. [citations omitted]

Underlying the reasoning in these cases is the thought that income is “realized” by the assignor because he, who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of procuring them. [citation omitted]

Although the donor here, by the transfer of the coupons, has precluded any possibility of his collecting them himself, he has nevertheless, by his act, procured payment of the interest, as a valuable gift to a member of his family. Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or property would seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment of his debt there, or such nonmaterial satisfactions as may result from the payment of a campaign or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son. Even though he never receives the money, he derives money’s worth from the disposition of the coupons which he has used as money or money’s worth in the procuring of a satisfaction which is procurable only by the expenditure of money or money’s worth. The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of his acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it would have been if he had collected the interest in dollars and expended them for any of the purposes named. [citation omitted]

In a real sense, he has enjoyed compensation for money loaned or services rendered, and not any the less so because it is his only reward for them. To say that one who has made a gift thus derived from interest or earnings paid to his donee has never enjoyed or realized the fruits of his investment or labor because he has assigned them instead of collecting them himself and then paying them over to the donee is to affront common understanding and to deny the facts of common experience. Common understanding and experience are the touchstones for the interpretation of the revenue laws.

The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income by him who exercises it. We have had no difficulty in applying that proposition where the assignment preceded the rendition of the services, Lucas v. Earl, supra; Burnet v. Leininger, supra, for it was recognized in the Leininger case that, in such a case, the rendition of the service by the assignor was the means by which the income was controlled by the donor, and of making his assignment effective. But it is the assignment by which the disposition of income is controlled when the service precedes the assignment, and, in both cases, it is the exercise of the power of disposition of the interest or compensation, with the resulting payment to the donee, which is the enjoyment by the donor of income derived from them.

….

The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when paid. See Corliss v. Bowers, supra, 281 U.S. 376, 378; Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283. The tax laid by the 1934 Revenue Act upon income “derived from … wages, or compensation for personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form paid …; also from interest …” therefore cannot fairly be interpreted as not applying to income derived from interest or compensation when he who is entitled to receive it makes use of his power to dispose of it in procuring satisfactions which he would otherwise procure only by the use of the money when received.

It is the statute which taxes the income to the donor although paid to his donee. Lucas v. Earl, supra; Burnet v. Leininger, supra. True, in those cases, the service which created the right to income followed the assignment, and it was arguable that, in point of legal theory, the right to the compensation vested instantaneously in the assignor when paid, although he never received it, while here, the right of the assignor to receive the income antedated the assignment which transferred the right, and thus precluded such an instantaneous vesting. But the statute affords no basis for such “attenuated subtleties.” The distinction was explicitly rejected as the basis of decision in Lucas v. Earl. It should be rejected here, for no more than in the Earl case can the purpose of the statute to tax the income to him who earns or creates and enjoys it be escaped by “anticipatory arrangements … however skilfully devised” to prevent the income from vesting even for a second in the donor.

Nor is it perceived that there is any adequate basis for distinguishing between the gift of interest coupons here and a gift of salary or commissions. The owner of a negotiable bond and of the investment which it represents, if not the lender, stands in the place of the lender. When, by the gift of the coupons, he has separated his right to interest payments from his investment and procured the payment of the interest to his donee, he has enjoyed the economic benefits of the income in the same manner and to the same extent as though the transfer were of earnings, and, in both cases, the import of the statute is that the fruit is not to be attributed to a different tree from that on which it grew. See Lucas v. Earl, supra, 281 U.S. at 115.

Reversed.

The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS.

….

The unmatured coupons given to the son were independent negotiable instruments, complete in themselves. Through the gift, they became at once the absolute property of the donee, free from the donor’s control and in no way dependent upon ownership of the bonds. No question of actual fraud or purpose to defraud the revenue is presented.

….

… The challenged judgment should be affirmed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS concur in this opinion.

Notes and Questions:

1. Under the rules of § 102, donors make gifts with after-tax income, and the donee may exclude the value of the gift from his gross income. Taxpayer Horst of course tried to reverse this.

2. No doubt, taxpayer’s son was in a lower tax bracket than taxpayer was. Hence, the bond interest would have been subject to a lower rate of tax if taxpayer had prevailed.

3. Consumption can take the form of directing income to another.

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether a financial institution realizes tax-deductible losses when it exchanges its interests in one group of residential mortgage loans for another lender’s interests in a different group of residential mortgage loans. We hold that such a transaction does give rise to realized losses.

I

Petitioner Cottage Savings Association (Cottage Savings) is a savings and loan association (S & L) formerly regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). Like many S & L’s, Cottage Savings held numerous long-term, low-interest mortgages that declined in value when interest rates surged in the late 1970’s. These institutions would have benefited from selling their devalued mortgages in order to realize tax-deductible losses. However, they were deterred from doing so by FHLBB accounting regulations, which required them to record the losses on their books. Reporting these losses consistent with the then-effective FHLBB accounting regulations would have placed many S & L’s at risk of closure by the FHLBB.

On its 1980 federal income tax return, Cottage Savings claimed a deduction for $2,447,091, which represented the adjusted difference between the face value of the participation interests that it traded and the fair market value of the participation interests that it received. As permitted by Memorandum R-49, Cottage Savings did not report these losses to the FHLBB. After the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed Cottage Savings’ claimed deduction, Cottage Savings sought a redetermination in the Tax Court. The Tax Court held that the deduction was permissible.

On appeal by the Commissioner, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Tax Court’s determination that Cottage Savings had realized its losses through the transaction. However, the court held that Cottage Savings was not entitled to a deduction because its losses were not “actually” sustained during the 1980 tax year for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 165(a).

Because of the importance of this issue to the S & L industry and the conflict among the Circuits over whether Memorandum R-49 exchanges produce deductible tax losses, we granted certiorari. We now reverse.

II

Rather than assessing tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the value of a taxpayer’s property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences of a gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer “realizes” the gain or loss. The realization requirement is implicit in § 1001(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a), which defines “[t]he gain [or loss] from the sale or other disposition of property” as the difference between “the amount realized” from the sale or disposition of the property and its “adjusted basis.” As this Court has recognized, the concept of realization is “founded on administrative convenience.” Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940). Under an appreciation-based system of taxation, taxpayers and the Commissioner would have to undertake the “cumbersome, abrasive, and unpredictable administrative task” of valuing assets on an annual basis to determine whether the assets had appreciated or depreciated in value. [citation omitted]. In contrast, “[a] change in the form or extent of an investment is easily detected by a taxpayer or an administrative officer.” R. Magill, Taxable Income 79 (rev. ed.1945).

Section 1001(a)’s language provides a straightforward test for realization: to realize a gain or loss in the value of property, the taxpayer must engage in a “sale or other disposition of [the] property.” The parties agree that the exchange of participation interests in this case cannot be characterized as a “sale” under § 1001(a); the issue before us is whether the transaction constitutes a “disposition of property.” The Commissioner argues that an exchange of property can be treated as a “disposition” under § 1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are materially different. The Commissioner further submits that, because the underlying mortgages were essentially economic substitutes, the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings were not materially different from those received from the other S & L’s. Cottage Savings, on the other hand, maintains that any exchange of property is a “disposition of property” under § 1001(a), regardless of whether the property exchanged is materially different. Alternatively, Cottage Savings contends that the participation interests exchanged were materially different because the underlying loans were secured by different properties.

We must therefore determine whether the realization principle in § 1001(a) incorporates a “material difference” requirement. If it does, we must further decide what that requirement amounts to and how it applies in this case. We consider these questions in turn.

A

Neither the language nor the history of the Code indicates whether and to what extent property exchanged must differ to count as a “disposition of property” under § 1001(a). Nonetheless, we readily agree with the Commissioner that an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event under § 1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are “materially different.” The Commissioner himself has, by regulation, construed § 1001(a) to embody a material difference requirement:

“Except as otherwise provided … the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained.”

Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1, 26 CFR § 1.1001-1 (1990) (emphasis added).

Because Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to promulgate “all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code],” 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), we must defer to his regulatory interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable, see National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-477 (1979).

We conclude that Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-1 is a reasonable interpretation of § 1001(a). Congress first employed the language that now comprises § 1001(a) of the Code in § 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253; that language has remained essentially unchanged through various reenactments. And since 1934, the Commissioner has construed the statutory term “disposition of property” to include a “material difference” requirement. As we have recognized, “‘Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law.’” United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-306 (1967), quoting Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).

Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-1 is also consistent with our landmark precedents on realization. In a series of early decisions involving the tax effects of property exchanges, this Court made clear that a taxpayer realizes taxable income only if the properties exchanged are “materially” or “essentially” different. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 173 (1921); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 253-254 (1924); Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 540-542 (1925); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207-212 (1920) (recognizing realization requirement). Because these decisions were part of the “contemporary legal context” in which Congress enacted § 202(a) of the 1924 Act, [citation omitted], and because Congress has left undisturbed through subsequent reenactments of the Code the principles of realization established in these cases, we may presume that Congress intended to codify these principles in § 1001(a) [citations omitted]. The Commissioner’s construction of the statutory language to incorporate these principles certainly was reasonable.

B

Precisely what constitutes a “material difference” for purposes of § 1001(a) of the Code is a more complicated question. The Commissioner argues that properties are “materially different” only if they differ in economic substance. To determine whether the participation interests exchanged in this case were “materially different” in this sense, the Commissioner argues, we should look to the attitudes of the parties, the evaluation of the interests by the secondary mortgage market, and the views of the FHLBB. We conclude that § 1001(a) embodies a much less demanding and less complex test.

Unlike the question whether § 1001(a) contains a material difference requirement, the question of what constitutes a material difference is not one on which we can defer to the Commissioner. For the Commissioner has not issued an authoritative, prelitigation interpretation of what property exchanges satisfy this requirement. Thus, to give meaning to the material difference test, we must look to the case law from which the test derives and which we believe Congress intended to codify in enacting and reenacting the language that now comprises § 1001(a). [citation omitted].

We start with the classic treatment of realization in Eisner v. Macomber, supra. In Macomber, a taxpayer who owned 2,200 shares of stock in a company received another 1,100 shares from the company as part of a pro rata stock dividend meant to reflect the company’s growth in value. At issue was whether the stock dividend constituted taxable income. We held that it did not, because no gain was realized. We reasoned that the stock dividend merely reflected the increased worth of the taxpayer’s stock, and that a taxpayer realizes increased worth of property only by receiving “something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property,” see 252 U.S. at 207.

In three subsequent decisions – United States v. Phellis, supra; Weiss v. Stearn, supra; and Marr v. United States, supra – we refined Macomber’s conception of realization in the context of property exchanges. In each case, the taxpayer owned stock that had appreciated in value since its acquisition. And in each case, the corporation in which the taxpayer held stock had reorganized into a new corporation, with the new corporation assuming the business of the old corporation. While the corporations in Phellis and Marr both changed from New Jersey to Delaware corporations, the original and successor corporations in Weiss both were incorporated in Ohio. In each case, following the reorganization, the stockholders of the old corporation received shares in the new corporation equal to their proportional interest in the old corporation.

The question in these cases was whether the taxpayers realized the accumulated gain in their shares in the old corporation when they received in return for those shares stock representing an equivalent proportional interest in the new corporations. In Phellis and Marr, we held that the transactions were realization events. We reasoned that, because a company incorporated in one State has “different rights and powers” from one incorporated in a different State, the taxpayers in Phellis and Marr acquired through the transactions property that was “materially different” from what they previously had. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. at 169-173; see Marr v. United States, supra, 268 U.S. at 540-542 (using phrase “essentially different”). In contrast, we held that no realization occurred in Weiss. By exchanging stock in the predecessor corporation for stock in the newly reorganized corporation, the taxpayer did not receive “a thing really different from what he theretofore had.” Weiss v. Stearn, supra. As we explained in Marr, our determination that the reorganized company in Weiss was not “really different” from its predecessor turned on the fact that both companies were incorporated in the same State. See Marr v. United States, supra, 268 U.S. at 540-542 (outlining distinction between these cases).

Obviously, the distinction in Phellis and Marr that made the stock in the successor corporations materially different from the stock in the predecessors was minimal. Taken together, Phellis, Marr, and Weiss stand for the principle that properties are “different” in the sense that is “material” to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or extent. Thus, separate groups of stock are not materially different if they confer “the same proportional interest of the same character in the same corporation.” Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. at 540. However, they are materially different if they are issued by different corporations, id. at 541; United States v. Phellis, supra, 257 U.S. at 173, or if they confer “differen[t] rights and powers” in the same corporation, Marr v. United States, supra, 268 U.S. at 541. No more demanding a standard than this is necessary in order to satisfy the administrative purposes underlying the realization requirement in § 1001(a). See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. at 116. For, as long as the property entitlements are not identical, their exchange will allow both the Commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the appreciated or depreciated values of the property relative to their tax bases.

In contrast, we find no support for the Commissioner’s “economic substitute” conception of material difference. According to the Commissioner, differences between properties are material for purposes of the Code only when it can be said that the parties, the relevant market (in this case the secondary mortgage market), and the relevant regulatory body (in this case the FHLBB) would consider them material. Nothing in Phellis, Weiss, and Marr suggests that exchanges of properties must satisfy such a subjective test to trigger realization of a gain or loss.

Moreover, the complexity of the Commissioner’s approach ill-serves the goal of administrative convenience that underlies the realization requirement. In order to apply the Commissioner’s test in a principled fashion, the Commissioner and the taxpayer must identify the relevant market, establish whether there is a regulatory agency whose views should be taken into account, and then assess how the relevant market participants and the agency would view the transaction. The Commissioner’s failure to explain how these inquiries should be conducted further calls into question the workability of his test.

Finally, the Commissioner’s test is incompatible with the structure of the Code. Section 1001(c) … provides that a gain or loss realized under § 1001(a) “shall be recognized” unless one of the Code’s nonrecognition provisions applies. One such nonrecognition provision withholds recognition of a gain or loss realized from an exchange of properties that would appear to be economic substitutes under the Commissioner’s material difference test. This provision, commonly known as the “like kind” exception, withholds recognition of a gain or loss realized

“on the exchange of property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment … for property of like kind which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.”

26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1).

If Congress had expected that exchanges of similar properties would not count as realization events under § 1001(a), it would have had no reason to bar recognition of a gain or loss realized from these transactions.

C

Under our interpretation of § 1001(a), an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event so long as the exchanged properties are “materially different” – that is, so long as they embody legally distinct entitlements. Cottage Savings’ transactions at issue here easily satisfy this test. Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L’s derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of the exchange.

The Commissioner contends that it is anomalous to treat mortgages deemed to be “substantially identical” by the FHLBB as “materially different.” The anomaly, however, is merely semantic; mortgages can be substantially identical for Memorandum R-49 purposes and still exhibit “differences” that are “material” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. Because Cottage Savings received entitlements different from those it gave up, the exchange put both Cottage Savings and the Commissioner in a position to determine the change in the value of Cottage Savings’ mortgages relative to their tax bases. Thus, there is no reason not to treat the exchange of these interests as a realization event, regardless of the status of the mortgages under the criteria of Memorandum R-49.

III

Although the Court of Appeals found that Cottage Savings’ losses were realized, it disallowed them on the ground that they were not sustained under § 165(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 165(a). …

The Commissioner offers a minimal defense of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. …

… In view of the Commissioner’s failure to advance any other arguments in support of the Court of Appeals’ ruling with respect to § 165(a), we conclude that, for purposes of this case, Cottage Savings sustained its losses within the meaning of § 165(a).

IV

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part – omitted.

Notes and Questions:

1. As a practical matter, what was wrong with the Commissioner’s arguments?

2. What is the test of “realization” that the Court derived from Phellis/Weiss/Marr?

3. In considering its earlier constructions of the “realization” requirement (part IIB of the opinion) in Macomber/Phellis/Weiss/Marr, the Court never mentioned the Sixteenth Amendment. Moreover, the Court stated in part IIB that administrative purposes underlie the “realization requirement.” By this time – if not earlier – the Court had de-constitutionalized the “realization” requirement – a matter that is critical to the Subpart F rules governing U.S. taxation of foreign source income.

4. The Court’s application of the realization requirement would seem to give taxpayers considerable control over the timing of tax gains and losses.

5. As the Court indicated in part IIB of its opinion, § 1001(c) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized.” In §§ 1031 to 1045 (among others), Congress “otherwise provided.” We briefly consider here § 1031 and § 1033.

• § 1031 (like-kind exchanges): § 1031(a) provides that “[no gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of real property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such property is exchanged solely for property of like kind which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.” Tax-deferred exchange treatment does not apply to property that the taxpayer holds “primarily” for resale. § 1032(a)(2). There may be little to distinguish between holding property as an investment and holding property for resale. The statute now contemplates dual purposes in holding real property, and the “primary” purpose controls.

The phrase “like kind” refers to the nature or character of the property, not its grade or quality. For example, improved and unimproved lands are of “like kind.” Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b).

Since it would be rare for the properties involved in an exchange to be worth the same amount, one or more parties may throw in something “to boot.” In such a case, the word “solely” in § 1031(a) does not require that the entire exchange be disqualified from § 1031 – only the assets that are not “like kind.” Taxpayer must recognize gain or boot received, whichever is less. § 1031(b). The assumption of a liability is treated as the payment of boot. Reg. § 1.1031-2.

To implement the principle that we tax all income once, the tax on gain is deferred through the transfer of basis. Section 1031(d) provides that the transferor’s basis in the property he received is the same as the basis he had in the property that he transferred, decreased by the amount of boot received, and increased by the amount of boot subject to immediate recognition or decreased by the amount of loss recognized. Such transfer of basis from one property to another has the effect of deferring, not excluding, eventual recognition of gain. Tax deferral under § 1031 is not optional but mandatory, a point that works against a taxpayer who wishes to recognize loss in a completed transaction as the taxpayer in Cottage Saving & Loan did.

Problems:

• 1. A, who is not a dealer in real estate, in 2010 exchanges real estate held for investment, which he purchased in 1995 for $50,000, for other real estate (to be held for productive use in trade or business) which has a fair market value of $60,000, and $20,000 in cash.

• How much gain did A derive from this dealing in property?

• How much gain must A recognize from this dealing in property?

• What is A’s adjusted basis in the property that he acquired in this transaction?

See Reg. § 1.1031(b)-1(b), Example 1.

• 1A. Suppose A exchanged the real property for other real estate which has a fmv of $40,000 and $40,000 of cash. How would your answers change?

• 2. B, an individual, owns an apartment house which has an adjusted basis in his hands of $500,000, but which is subject to a mortgage of $150,000. On September 1, 1954, he transfers the apartment house to C, receiving in exchange therefor $50,000 in cash and another apartment house with a fair market value on that date of $600,000. The transfer to C is made subject to the $150,000 mortgage.

• How much gain did B derive from this dealing in property?

• How much gain must B recognize from this dealing in property?

• What is B’s adjusted basis in the property that he acquired in this transaction?

See Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2, Example 1.

• § 1033 (involuntary exchanges): A taxpayer whose property is destroyed, stolen, seized, requisitioned, or condemned may receive money for the property. The receipt of money would require taxpayer to treat such an “involuntary conversion” of property into money as a recognition event. If taxpayer uses the proceeds of the involuntary conversion to procure property “similar or related in service or use to the property so converted,” taxpayer does not have to recognize gain except to the extent the amount of money received exceeds the cost of the replacement property. § 1031(a)(2)(A). Again the deferral of recognition is handled through a transfer of basis from the converted property to the replacement property, decreased by the money that taxpayer did not spend on the replacement property and increased by the amount of gain taxpayer recognized on the conversion (or decreased by the amount of loss taxpayer recognized on the conversion). § 1033(b)(1). In the case of an involuntary conversion, tax deferral is elective. § 1033(a)(2)(A).

Problem:

• A’s vessel which has an adjusted basis of $100,000 is destroyed in 2015, and receives in 2016 an insurance payment of $210,000. A invests $150,000 of the insurance proceeds in a new vessel. A makes the election under § 1033(a)(2)(A).

• How much gain does A derive from this dealing in property?

• How much gain must A recognize from this dealing in property?

• What is A’s basis in the replacement vessel?

See Reg. § 1.1033(b)-1, Example.

Basically, taxpayer has dominion and control over a monetary accession to wealth if, as a practical matter, he may spend it without interference from others. The so-called “claim of right” doctrine – which the Court first announced in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932) – implements this principle.

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:

The taxpayer Edward M. Gilbert appeals from a determination by the tax court that he realized taxable income on certain unauthorized withdrawals of corporate funds made by him in 1962. We reverse.

On about June 1, Gilbert returned to New York from Nevada, where he had been attending to a personal matter. Shortly thereafter he consulted with Shearman, Sterling & Wright, who were outside counsel to Bruce at the time, regarding the withdrawals. They, he, and another Bruce director initiated negotiations to sell many of the Celotex shares to Ruberoid Company as a way of recouping most of Bruce’s outlay.

On June 8, Gilbert went to the law offices of Shearman, Sterling & Wright and executed interest-bearing promissory notes to Bruce for $1,953,000 secured by an assignment of most of his property. [(footnote omitted)]. The notes were callable by Bruce on demand, with presentment and notice of demand waived by Gilbert. The tax court found that up through June 12 the net value of the assets assigned for security by Gilbert substantially exceeded the amount owed. [(footnote omitted)].

After Gilbert informed other members of the Bruce board of directors of his actions, a meeting of the board was scheduled for the morning of June 12. At the meeting the board accepted the note and assignment but refused to ratify Gilbert’s unauthorized withdrawals. During the meeting, word came that the board of directors of the Ruberoid Company had rejected the price offered for sale of the Celotex stock. Thereupon, the Bruce board demanded and received Gilbert’s resignation and decided to issue a public announcement the next day regarding his unauthorized withdrawals. All further attempts on June 12 to arrange a sale of the Celotex stock fell through and in the evening Gilbert flew to Brazil, where he stayed for several months. On June 13 the market price of Bruce and Celotex stock plummeted, and trading in those shares was suspended by the Securities and Exchanges Commission.

On these facts, the tax court determined that Gilbert realized income when he made the unauthorized withdrawals of funds from Bruce, and that his efforts at restitution did not entitle him to any offset against this income.

The starting point for analysis of this case is James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), which established that embezzled funds can constitute taxable income to the embezzler.

When a taxpayer acquires earnings, lawfully or unlawfully, without the consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obligation to repay and without restriction as to their disposition, “he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.”

Id. at 219 [(quoting North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932)].

The Commissioner contends that there can never be “consensual recognition … of an obligation to repay” in an embezzlement case. He reasons that because the corporation as represented by a majority of the board of directors was unaware of the withdrawals, there cannot have been consensual recognition of the obligation to repay at the time the taxpayer Gilbert acquired the funds. Since the withdrawals were not authorized and the directors refused to treat them as a loan to Gilbert, the Commissioner concludes that Gilbert should be taxed like a thief rather than a borrower.

In a typical embezzlement, the embezzler intends at the outset to abscond with the funds. If he repays the money during the same taxable year, he will not be taxed. See James v. Commissioner, supra at 220; Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1975); Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965 2 Cum. Bul. 50. As we held in Buff v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974), if he spends the loot instead of repaying, he cannot avoid tax on his embezzlement income simply by signing promissory notes later in the same year. See also id. at 849-50 (Oakes, J., concurring).

When Gilbert executed the assignment to Bruce of his assets on June 8 and when this assignment for security was accepted by the Bruce board on June 12, the net market value of these assets was substantially more than the amount owed. The Bruce board did not release Gilbert from his underlying obligation to repay, but the assignment was nonetheless valid and Bruce’s failure to make an appropriate filing to protect itself against the claims of third parties, such as the IRS, did not relieve Gilbert of the binding effect of the assignment. Since the assignment secured an immediate payable note, Gilbert had as of June 12 granted Bruce full discretion to liquidate any of his assets in order to recoup on the $1,953,000 withdrawal. Thus, Gilbert’s net accretion in real wealth on the overall transaction was zero: he had for his own use withdrawn $1,953,000 in corporate funds but he had now granted the corporation control over at least $1,953,000 worth of his assets.

We conclude that where a taxpayer withdraws funds from a corporation which he fully intends to repay and which he expects with reasonable certainty he will be able to repay, where he believes that his withdrawals will be approved by the corporation, and where he makes a prompt assignment of assets sufficient to secure the amount owed, he does not realize income on the withdrawals under the James test. When Gilbert acquired the money, there was an express consensual recognition of his obligation to repay: the secretary of the corporation, who signed the checks, the officers and directors to whom Gilbert gave contemporaneous notification, and Gilbert himself were all aware that the transaction was in the nature of a loan. Moreover, the funds were certainly not received by Gilbert “without restriction as to their disposition” as is required for taxability under James; the money was to be used solely for the temporary purpose of meeting certain margin calls and it was so used. For these reasons, we reverse the decision of the tax court.

Notes and Questions:

1. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) was an embezzlement case. The Supreme Court had held in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946) that an embezzler did not realize gross income because he was subject to an obligation to repay the embezzled funds. Taxpayer had no bona fide claim of right to the funds. Id. at 408. In Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 139 (1952), the Supreme Court held that taxpayer must include money that he obtained by extortion in his gross income. James shifted the focus of such cases from the bona fides of a claim of right to consensual recognition of an obligation to repay. Gilbert turned on whether there was a consensual recognition of an obligation to repay.

2. When must that consensual recognition of an obligation to repay exist? Does the following excerpt from Gilbert answer the question?

As we held in Buff v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974), if he spends the loot instead of repaying, he cannot avoid tax on his embezzlement income simply by signing promissory notes later in the same year.

See also id. at 849-50 (Oakes, J., concurring).

3. The withdrawals from the E.L. Bruce Company were “unauthorized.” Does that mean that there could not have been a “consensual recognition of an obligation to repay?”

4. If taxpayer has acquired funds without restriction as to their disposition, he has a power to spend them on consumption – one of the elements of the SHS definition of income. Did taxpayer Gilbert ever feel free to spend the money as he pleased?

5. It seems that taxpayer was willing to “bet the company” and had done so before. E.L. Bruce Company evidently willingly reaped the rewards of a good bet and only fired Gilbert when he made a bad one. Cf. second footnote of Gilbert. Is that relevant to the income tax question that the facts of Gilbert raise?

6. Why are loan proceeds not included in taxpayer’s gross income? After all, taxpayer may act without restriction as to their disposition?

7. Security and damage deposits: An electric utility company (IPL) requires customers with suspect credit to make a security deposit to assure prompt payment of utility bills. Customers are entitled to a refund of their deposit upon establishing good credit or making a sufficient number of timely payments. The electric company treated the deposits as a current liability. So long as the company refunded the deposits when customers were entitled to them, the company could spend the money as it chose. Should the utility include the deposits in its gross income? The answer to this question turns on whether the company had “complete dominion” over the funds.

IPL hardly enjoyed ‘complete dominion’ over the customer deposits entrusted to it. Rather, these deposits were acquired subject to an express ‘obligation to repay,’ either at the time service was terminated or at the time a customer established good credit. So long as the customer fulfills his legal obligation to make timely payments, his deposit ultimately is to be refunded, and both the timing and method of that refund are largely within the control of the customer.

… In determining whether a taxpayer enjoys ‘complete dominion’ over a given sum, the crucial point is not whether his use of the funds is unconstrained during some interim period. The key is whether the taxpayer has some guarantee that he will be allowed to keep the money. IPL’s receipt of these deposits was accompanied by no such guarantee.

CIR v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1990).

What facts do you think are relevant to whether a payment is a security or damage deposit? Consider what terms you would include in a lease that you drafted for a landlord.

Do the CALI lesson, Basic Income Taxation: Gross Income: Realization Concepts in Gross Income.

Do the CALI lesson, Basic Income Taxation: Gross Income: Indirect Transfers for Services.

1. What policies does a broad definition of “gross income” implement and how?

2. What is the tax treatment of a return of capital? How does this treatment implement the principle that we tax income once?

3. In determining whether a taxpayer should include certain forms of consumption in his gross income, why should it matter that taxpayer has no discretion in what it is he must consume (for example, a trip to Germany to view Volkswagen facilities)?

4. The exchange of appreciated property to pay for something implements the principal that we tax all income once. How?

5. What economic distortions result from the Code’s failure to tax imputed income?

Can you explain or define –

• Eisner v. Macomber; definition of “gross income,” the significance of “realization”

• When and how a shareholder’s share of undistributed corporate income is taxed

• This definitional characteristic of “basis:” money that will not be subject to tax (again)

• Basis as the way taxpayer keeps score with the government

• Glenshaw Glass; definition of “gross income”

• Realization of income without actual receipt but through control of its disposition

• Constitutional importance of direct vs. indirect taxes

• Income tax treatment of –

• receiving a windfall

• receiving punitive damages

• receiving compensatory damages

• someone else paying taxpayer’s obligation

• receiving a benefit over which taxpayer has no discretion to control

• receiving a return of capital

• receiving barter income

• using appreciated (depreciated property) to pay for something

• receiving imputed income from performing services

• receiving imputed income from owning property

• benefitting from a discharge (forgiveness) of indebtedness

• stealing money

• § 1001 formula for determining gain or loss; why is relief from a liability included in “amount realized”

• Time value of money; present value; future value

• Realization upon exchange of legal entitlements different in kind or extent

• Exchange of “materially different” properties that are “like-kind”

• Dominion and control

• Claim of right doctrine; test of James v. United States

• Difference in fact between a loan and stealing money

• Tax treatment of security deposits

• Tax treatment of like-kind exchanges and involuntary conversions

• How does Congress defer recognizing gain without forgiving it?